dubonaire wrote: ↑Fri Oct 09, 2020 10:52 pm
galanter2 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 09, 2020 9:10 pm
dubonaire wrote: ↑Fri Oct 09, 2020 8:34 pm
Blairio wrote: ↑Fri Oct 09, 2020 3:09 am
dubonaire wrote: ↑Fri Oct 09, 2020 12:25 am
Dr. Sketch-n-Etch wrote: ↑Thu Oct 08, 2020 11:17 pm
dubonaire, I wasn't arguing that, because the earth is going to end anyway, there is no need for morality. I was just pointing out that if we destroy the earth (or harm it a lot) due to our selfishness and/or carelessness, that this is immoral, whereas when the sun expands to engulf the earth, this is not immoral. The earth is harmed either way. Morality/immorality is thus a matter of perception.
Aah OK got it. Sorry for misunderstanding. I don't agree with your logic though. I think the common element in your thesis is intent, or lack of it, or put more simply, the ability to reason.
Intent and Reason are quite different. Intent is an aim or a plan (requiring will to implement), while reason in this context is the ability to understand.
Not in the strange vernacular of philosophy.
Are you sure? Please cite a philosopher who equates intent with the ability to reason.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/
Yes, I'm aware of the special notions of intentionality in philosophy. But I've not seen it as a reference to the ability to reason. And I don't see where this article equates intent with the ability to reason.
In a moral philosophy setting, intention can refer to something more like the common meaning. If you accidentally hit someone with your car, that's morally different than if you pick them out and aim your car at them. In moral philosophy that kind of everyday intention matters. And most people understand, and in fact even some animals seem to understand, the difference between an unintended act and an intentional act.
But it's entirely possible in cases of moral philosophy to have an act that is fully intended but highly irrational. Surely you've encountered this in life.
But there is also intentionality as discussed here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cons ... tionality/
In philosophy of mind intentionality has an unusual meaning. It's about mental representation, and simply refers to the way our thoughts correspond to objects or events in the world. This is something most of us take for granted and don't have a particular word for. But in order to talk about the way mental events/objects correspond to real world events/objects, philosophers have overloaded the word "intentionality" with this new meaning.
But that's not the same as a reference to the ability to reason.